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Abstract
The ultimatum game has been a prominent paradigm in studying the evolution of fairness. It predicts that
responders should accept any nonzero offer and proposers should offer the smallest possible amount accord-
ing to orthodox game theory. However, the prediction strongly contradicts with experimental findings where
responders usually reject low offers below 20% and proposers usually make higher offers than expected. To
explain the evolution of such fair behaviors, we here introduce empathy in group-structured populations by
allowing a proportion α of the population to play empathetic strategies. Interestingly, we find that for high
mutation probabilities, the mean offer decreases with α and the mean demand increases, implying empathy
inhibits the evolution of fairness. For low mutation probabilities, the mean offer and demand approach to the
fair ones with increasing α, implying empathy promotes the evolution of fairness. Furthermore, under both
weak and strong intensities of natural selection, we analytically calculate the mean offer and demand for
different levels of α. Counterintuitively, we demonstrate that although a higher mutation probability leads
to a higher level of fairness under weak selection, an intermediate mutation probability corresponds to the
lowest level of fairness under strong selection. Our study provides systematic insights into the evolutionary
origin of fairness in group-structured populations with empathetic strategies.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
∗Electronic address: aming.li@zoo.ox.ac.uk
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
04
23
5v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
2 F
eb
 20
19
I. INTRODUCTION
In the canonical ultimatum game, one player proposes a division of a sum of money between
himself/herself and a second player, who might accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal
is accepted, the sum is shared accordingly; if not, both players remain empty handed. On the
assumption of orthodox game theory, the responder should accept any nonzero offer and the pro-
poser should offer the smallest possible amount. However, human behavioral experiments show
a different reality: responders reject low offers below 20% about half of the time and proposers
usually make higher offers than expected to avoid rejection [1–3]. The problem on the evolution
of fairness has been mainly studied by a great diversity of models under the framework of game
theory and evolutionary game theory [4].
Evolutionary game dynamics focuses on the evolution of fairness among selfish and interactive
individuals [5–15], where strategies with higher fitness are more likely to spread among individ-
uals. Under this evolutionary framework, the conditions under which the fair strategy is favored
by natural selection have been attracting considerable interest. In unstructured populations with-
out invoking additional mechanisms, natural selection itself can lead to the rational self-interest
strategy, where agents offer the smallest amount and accept any nonzero offer [16, 17]. Consid-
ering this, researchers have investigated a large number of factors to explain how the fair strategy
evolves in the two-person ultimatum game [16–36] as well as the multi-person scenario [37, 38].
For the two-person ultimatum game, these factors are reputation [16], empathy [17–21], alternat-
ing role [22, 23], randomness [24, 25], spite [26, 27], altering the stake size [28], spatial population
structure [19, 29–36], and so on. Particularly, some models comprise different factors, for exam-
ple, the effects of empathy [19], adaptive role switching [22, 23], random allocation [25], and
migration [35] have been studied in spatially structured populations.
Empathy, meaning that individuals only make offers that they would themselves be ready to
accept, has attracted much attention in modeling human behavior. When all players are assumed
to play empathetic strategies, fair offers can be evolved in unstructured populations [18]. Under the
same assumption, empathetic players also result in the evolution of fairness in regular graphs [19]
and other complex networks [20]. Page and Nowak have found that in unstructured populations,
allowing a small proportion α of the population to play empathetic strategies is enough to favor
the evolution of fairness [21]. However, if natural selection acts upon α, they also have shown
that empathy is not selected by natural selection. Considering this, Iranzo et al. have reported
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that empathy itself can be selected whenever players are restricted to interact with a fraction of the
total population [39].
Here, we study the effects of empathy on the evolution of fairness in group-structured popu-
lations. Indeed, the group-structured population is ubiquitous in nature [39–41], for example, the
group can be understood as an island in population genetics or a particular organization in human
society. We introduce empathy by initially allowing a proportion α of the population to play empa-
thetic strategies. It is noteworthy that the single-group case of our model degenerates to the simple
scenario [21], where authors have only focused on small α and very low mutation probabilities. In
contrast, we make a comprehensive analysis here by varying α and the mutation probability from
0 to 1. Furthermore, we also investigate how the intensity of selection influences the evolution of
fairness. Considering the advantages of temporal networks over their static counterparts [42–45],
we introduce migration in the model and allow the interactive network to change with time. Under
both weak and strong intensities of selection, we analytically provide the mean offer and demand
for different levels of α.
II. MODEL
Consider a population with N players, in which each player belongs to one of M groups. Each
player (say i) interacts with all other players in the same group, and receives the total payoff Pi.
The fitness of the player i is defined as 1 − ω + ωPi, where ω is called the intensity of natural
selection [46]. The extreme case ω → 0 corresponds to weak selection. For ω = 1, the fitness
is identical to the payoff, and the case ω → 1 corresponds to strong selection. When two players
interact, they play the ultimatum game twice, and they are assigned to the roles of proposer and
responder in turn. The proposer suggests how to split a fixed sum (say 1) and the responder decides
whether or not to accept the proposal. When the responder accepts it, the offer is split accordingly;
otherwise, both players get nothing. The strategy is usually denoted by a vector (p, q) where
p ∈ [0, 1] is the amount offered when the player acts as a proposer, and q ∈ [0, 1] is the minimum
amount demanded when the player acts as a responder. An offer p1 is accepted by a responder
with the minimum demand q2 if and only if p1 ≥ q2. Therefore, the payoff for a player using the
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Model schematic. Ten players (represented by nodes, N = 10), eight of whom
(nodes with ×) play independent strategies and the remainder (nodes with +) play empathetic strategies
(p = q), are distributed over four groups (shaded by blue, M = 4). In a given generation, a player with an
independent strategy is chosen to reproduce one offspring (empty square) and a player (node under cross)
is chosen to die. The newborn offspring randomly adopts an independent strategy with probability 1 − uα
and an empathetic strategy with uα. The offspring stays in his parent’s group with 1 − v and he randomly
migrates to one other group with v.
strategy (p1, q1) against another player using the strategy (p2, q2) is given by
a((p1, q1), (p2, q2)) =

0 p1 < q2, p2 < q1
p2 p1 < q2, p2 ≥ q1
1 − p1 p1 ≥ q2, p2 < q1
1 − p1 + p2 p1 ≥ q2, p2 ≥ q1
. (1)
If a strategy (p, q) satisfies p = q, i.e., the offer that a player makes is equal to the minimum
offer that he prepares to accept, the strategy is called as an empathetic strategy. If p and q of
a strategy (p, q) are independent of each other, the strategy is an independent strategy. Initially,
each player adopts a random empathetic strategy with probability α ∈ [0, 1], and adopts a random
independent strategy with probability 1 − α. The update follows the frequency-dependent Moran
process [46]. As shown in Fig. 1, a player is chosen proportional to his fitness to reproduce
one offspring and a player is randomly chosen to die in each generation. The newborn offspring
adopts his parent’s strategy with probability 1 − u; otherwise, he mutates to a random empathetic
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strategy with probability α and a random independent strategy with probability 1 − α. Moreover,
the newborn offspring is allowed to migrate to one new group with probability v; otherwise, he
stays in his parent’s group. We assume that the M groups are located in a circle. The new group
can be one of two groups closest to his parent’s group for local migration, and any one group
except his parent’s group for global migration. It is noteworthy that all players adopt independent
strategies for α = 0 and empathetic strategies for α = 1 during the whole evolutionary process.
For 0 < α < 1, the fraction of empathetic strategies fluctuates around α during the evolutionary
process. For simplicity, α is called the fraction of empathetic strategies hereafter.
III. RESULTS
We first perform agent-based simulations by varying the fraction of empathetic strategies α
and the intensity of natural selection ω. For each set of simulation parameters, we determine the
mean offer and demand, which are the time-averaged values of p and q over the whole population,
respectively.
Figure 2 shows how ω influences the mean offer and demand. When ω is very small (ω ≈ 0),
neutral drift dominates the evolutionary dynamics, indicating that the mean offer and demand
are close to 0.5. As ω increases but is still small, both the mean offer and demand decrease
significantly with ω. When α is small, the decreasing trends mainly depend on the evolution of
independent strategies. According to Eq. (1), a lower offer has a payoff advantage over a higher
offer for independent strategies, i.e., a((p, ∗), (p+, ∗)) ≥ a((p+, ∗), (p, ∗)) with  > 0. Moreover,
the increase of ω significantly enlarges the payoff advantage of lower offers over higher offers.
Therefore, we have the significant decrease of the mean offer with ω. The decrease of the mean
offer drives the mean demand to decrease accordingly in order to avoid rejection. When α is
large, the decreasing trends mainly depend on the evolution of empathetic strategies. According
to Eq. (1), for empathetic strategies, the strategy with p < 0.5 has a payoff advantage over the
strategy with p > 0.5, i.e., the payoff of p = 0.5 −  ( > 0) is more than that of p = 0.5 + .
The initial increase of ω enlarges the payoff advantage of p < 0.5 over p > 0.5, and it leads to
the significant decrease of the mean offer and demand. When ω becomes sufficiently large and
further increases, the mean offer or demand remains around non-zero constants. The reason for
the existence of the non-zero constant is as follows. The numerator and the denominator of the
probability that a player reproduces an offspring linearly depend on ω. When ω is sufficiently
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The changing trends of the mean offer p and demand q with the intensity of selection
ω. p and q significantly decrease when ω increases from 0. They remain around non-zero constants when
ω is sufficiently large. ((a), (b)) For low mutation probabilities (u = 0.1), p and q approach to 0.5 with in-
creasing fraction of empathetic strategies α. ((c), (d)) For high mutation probabilities (u = 0.4), p decreases
with α and q increases with α. Parameters: N = 50, M = 9, r = 1, and v = 0.1.
large, it can be simultaneously eliminated from the numerator and the denominator. Accordingly,
the payoff advantage of lower offers over higher offers or the payoff advantage of p < 0.5 over
p > 0.5 cannot be enlarged by increasing ω. Consequently, the mean offer or demand can not
change with ω and remains around non-zero constants.
As shown in Figs. 2 and 3, the effects of α on the mean offer and demand depend on ω and the
mutation probability u. When ω is very small, the mean offer and demand change very little with
α (Figs. 3a, 3b), because neutral drift dominates the evolutionary dynamics. As sufficiently large
ω further increases, the changing trends of the mean offer and demand with α are affected by u.
When u is low, they both approach to the fair ones with increasing α (Figs. 2a, 2b, 3c, 3d), implying
that empathy promotes the evolution of fairness. When u is high, the mean offer decreases with
α, but the mean demand increases with α (Figs. 2c, 2d, 3c, 3d), implying that empathy inhibits
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The changing trends of the mean offer p and demand q with the fraction of empathetic
strategies α. p and q change very little with α for sufficiently small intensities of selection ω in ((a), (b))
and sufficiently high mutation probabilities u in ((c), (d)). (c) p increases with α for low u, but decreases
with α for high u. (d) q increases with α for all u. Parameters: N = 50, M = 9, r = 1, v = 0.1, ((a), (b))
u = 0.1, and ((c), (d)) ω = 1.
the evolution of fairness. Particularly, they both change very little when u is sufficiently high
(Figs. 3c, 3d). The results can be intuitively understood as follows. When u is low, the payoff
difference plays the major role in the strategy selection compared to the mutation process. We
take two extreme cases α = 0 and α = 1 for instance. We have known that lower offers have the
payoff advantage over higher offers for α = 0. According to Eq. (1), the offer closer to 0.5 has the
payoff advantage over the one further away 0.5 for α = 1, i.e., a strategy with p > 0.5 has a higher
payoff than that with p +  ( > 0) and a strategy with p < 0.5 has a higher payoff than that with
p −  ( > 0). Therefore, the mean offer for α = 0 is less than the one for α = 1. Accordingly,
the mean demand for α = 0 is less than the one for α = 1 in order to avoid rejection. When u is
high, the mutation process plays the major role in the strategy selection compared to the payoff
difference. By means of the mutation process, the strategies with high offers or high demands
are frequently introduced in the evolutionary process for α = 0, but only the strategies with high
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Under weak selection, comparison of theoretical results and numerical results. When
the intensity of selection ω is small, our analytical calculations of the mean offer p are in good agreement
with the simulated values for different population sizes (N), group numbers (M), mutation probabilities (u),
migration probabilities (v), and migration patterns (both local and global migration).
offers and high demands are frequently introduced for α = 1. However, only the strategies with
high offers and low demands can achieve enough payoffs to survive in the population. Therefore,
the mean offer for α = 0 is more than the one for α = 1, but the mean demand for α = 0 is less
than the one for α = 1.
After presenting agent-based numerical results, we turn to theoretical calculations. It has been
shown that under weak selection, the mean offer and demand change little with α. Accordingly,
we focus on the case with α = 1, where all players use continuous empathetic strategies. Here, a
strategy can be described by a single parameter p ∈ [0, 1]. The mean offer p is calculated in the
Appendix, and its analytical expression is as follows:
p =
1
2
− ω (1 − u)(N − 1)
24Mu
M∑
x=1
(Ψ1( f (x)) − Ψ2( f (x))), (2)
where Ψ1( f ) =
1−v(1− f )
1+(N−1)v(1− f ) , Ψ2( f ) =
(1−u)(1−v(1− f ))
1+(N−1)u+(N−1)(1−u)v(1− f ) , and f (x) describes the migration
pattern. The expression of f (x) is f (x) = 1M−1
∑M−1
j=1 cos
2pi jx
M for global migration and is f (x) =
cos 2pixM for local migration. Figure 4 shows when the intensity of selection is small, analytical
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The effects of the mutation probability u, the migration probability v, and the popu-
lation size N on the mean offer p when all players use empathetic strategies (α = 1). p of local migration
has a very small difference from p of global migration. p increases with u in (a), increases with v in (b), but
decreases with N in (c). Parameters: M = 9, ω = 0.001, (a) N = 100, (b) u = 0.1, and (c) v = 0.1.
results agree well with numerical results for different population sizes (N), mutation probabilities
(u), migration probabilities (v), group numbers (M), and migration patterns (both local and global
migration).
As shown in Fig. 5, the mean offer of local migration is very close to the one of global mi-
gration, implying that the migration pattern has a negligible effect on the evolution of fairness.
Therefore, we focus on the mean offer of global migration, which can be obtained analytically.
From f (x) = 1M−1
∑M−1
j=1 cos
2pi jx
M , we have f (M) = 1 and f (x) = − 1M−1 when x ∈ {1, · · · ,M − 1}.
Substituting these values into Eq. (8), we have
p = 12 − ω (1−u)(N−1)N24M ( 11+(N−1)u +
(M−1)(1−v MM−1 )
(1+(N−1)v MM−1 )(1+(N−1)u+(N−1)v MM−1−(N−1)uv MM−1 )
). (3)
It is easy to verify that the mean offer increases with the mutation probability and the migration
probability, but decreases with the population size. The result is also shown in Fig. 5. Accordingly,
mutation and migration promotes the evolution of fairness, but the population size inhibits the
evolution of fairness. In order to make sure that almost all players can participate in games, we
here assume that the population size is two times more than the group number M.
It has been shown that under strong selection, the mean offer and demand change significantly
with α. Moreover, the results for any α are between those under two extreme cases α = 1 and
α = 0. Therefore, we calculate the approximate values of the mean offer and demand for α = 1 and
α = 0. When α = 1, we use the replicator dynamics of S discrete strategies A = {0, 1S−1 , · · · , 1}.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Under strong selection (ω = 1), comparison of theoretical results and numerical
results. ((a), (b)) When all players use independent strategies (α = 0), our analytical calculations of the
mean offer p and demand q (S = 7, 30, 40) are in good agreement with the simulated values for different
mutation probabilities u. (c) When all players use empathetic strategies (α = 1), our analytical calculations
of p (S = 100) are in good agreement with the simulated values for different u.
By employing xi to denote the frequency of the strategy i ∈ A, we have
dxi
dt
=
xi × pii × (1 − u)
φ
+
u
S
− xi, (4)
where pii is the payoff of the strategy i, and φ =
∑S
i=1 xipii is the average payoff of the population.
When α = 0, we use the replicator dynamics of S 2 discrete strategies. Similarly, by using x(i, j) to
denote the frequency of the strategy (i, j) ∈ A × A, we have
dx(i, j)
dt
=
x(i, j) × pi(i, j) × (1 − u)
Φ
+
u
S 2
− x(i, j), (5)
where pi(i, j) is the payoff of the strategy (i, j), and Φ =
∑S
i=1
∑S
j=1 x(i, j)pi(i, j) is the average payoff
of the population. When all strategies have identical initial frequencies, the stationary solutions
of the above replicator equations, which no longer change with time, are denoted by xi and x(i, j).
When α = 1, we approximate the mean offer by
∑S
i=1
i−1
S−1 xi with sufficiently large S . When
α = 0, we approximate the mean offer and the mean demand by
∑S
i=1
i−1
S−1 x(i, j) and
∑S
j=1
j−1
S−1 x(i, j)
with sufficiently large S 2, respectively. As shown in Fig. 6, our approximations agree well with
simulated results for different mutation probabilities. For α = 0, the mean offer and demand
approach to the fair ones with increasing mutation probability, implying that mutation promotes
the evolution of fairness. For α = 1, an intermediate mutation probability corresponds to the
lowest level of fairness (lowest mean offer), implying that mutation may inhibit the evolution
of cooperation. This is different from the counterpart of weak selection, which is that a higher
mutation probability leads to a higher level of fairness.
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IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Empathetic players cannot survive in unstructured populations [21], but can whenever players
are restricted to interact with a fraction of the total population [39]. Moreover, the survival of em-
pathetic players is the precondition of studying the effects of empathy on the evolution of fairness.
Accordingly in this paper, we focused on group-structured populations, where interaction occurs
among players in the same group. We introduced empathy by allowing a proportion α of the popu-
lation to play empathetic strategies. For high mutation probabilities, the mean offer decreases with
α but the mean demand increases with α, implying that empathy inhibits the evolution of fairness.
For low mutation probabilities, they both approach to the fair ones with increasing α, implying that
empathy promotes the evolution of fairness. The difference of the phenomena above is resulted
from the decisive factor of the strategy selection, which is the mutation process for high mutation
probabilities and the payoff difference for low mutation probabilities.
We also investigated how the intensity of selection ω influences the evolution of fairness in
finite populations. The mean offer and demand significantly decrease with ω when it is small,
but no longer change with ω when it is large. For large ω, the linear dependence of the fitness
on the payoff makes ω omitted from the numerator and the denominator of the probability that a
player reproduces an offspring. It implies that sufficiently large ω no longer enlarges the payoff
difference of one strategy over another. Therefore, the mean offer and demand remain around non-
zero constants when sufficiently large ω increases. The previous study has discussed the problem
in unstructured populations [24]. It has been shown that sufficiently large ω drives the mean offer
and demand to converge to the rational self-interested strategy p = q = 0. The difference of this
result from our result is caused by the exponential dependence of the fitness on the payoff in the
previous model, which implies that the payoff advantage of a lower offer over a higher offer can
be increasingly enlarged by raising large ω.
We further analytically calculated the mean offer for an extreme case α = 1 under weak se-
lection. Based on this analytical result, we found that mutation and migration can promote the
evolution of fairness, while the population size cannot. The reason why we did not investigate
other levels of α is twofold: a) The mean offer and demand for any α are close to the mean of-
fer for α = 1; b) The mean offer and demand for α = 0 have been obtained in the previous
literature [28], which has only studied the effects of varying the stake on fairness. Under strong
selection, the mean offer and demand for any α are between those for α = 0 and α = 1. Ac-
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cordingly, we analytically achieved the mean offer and demand for α = 0 and α = 1 by using the
replicator dynamics, which does not involve population size and migration. Counterintuitively, we
demonstrate that although a higher mutation probability leads to a higher level of fairness under
weak selection for α = 1, an intermediate mutation probability corresponds to the lowest level
of fairness under strong selection. Our theoretical results above were all verified by numerical
simulations.
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Appendix
When all players use empathetic strategies, the mean offer p is calculated as follows. We first
discretize the continuous strategy p ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we calculate the average frequencies of all
discrete strategies according to the results on discrete strategies. When the number of discrete
strategies tends to +∞, the weighted average of all discrete strategies whose weights are the fre-
quencies tends to the mean offer.
Assume that all players choose strategies from S discrete empathetic strategies {0, 1S−1 , · · · , 1}.
Now, the original continuous problem is changed into a discrete one, and we focus on the stationary
frequency of the above S strategies. According to [47], the average frequency of the kth strategy
over the stationary distribution under weak selection (ω→ 0), 〈xk〉ω→0, is given by
〈xk〉ω→0 = 1S + ω 1−uNu (Γ1(akk − a∗∗) + Γ2(ak∗ − a∗k) + Γ3(ak∗ − a)),
Γ1 = (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)∑Mx=1(−2Φ1Ψ2 − Φ4α1 + 3Ψ2),
Γ2 = (N − 1)/(3M)∑Mx=1(3Ψ1 − 3Ψ2 + (N − 2)(−2Φ1Ψ2 − Φ4α1 + Φ2Ψ2 + Φ3Ψ1 + Φ5α1)),
Γ3 = (N − 1)(N − 2)/(3M)∑Mx=1(3Ψ1 − 3Ψ2 + 2(2Φ1Ψ2 + Φ4α1 − Φ2Ψ2 − Φ3Ψ1 − Φ5α1)),
(6)
where α1 = 1−u1+(N−1)u , the above Φi and Ψi omit ( f (x)), Φ1( f ) =
(1−u)(2−v(1− f ))
2+(N−2)u+ 2(N−2)(1−u)v3 (1− f )
, Φ2( f ) =
2−u−v(1− f )
2+ 2(N−2)u3 +
(N−2)(2−u)v
3 (1− f )
, Φ3( f ) =
(1−u)(2−v(1− f ))
2+ 2(N−2)u3 +
(N−2)(2−u)v
3 (1− f )
, Φ4( f ) =
(1−u)(1−v(1− f ))
1+ (N−2)u2 +
(N−2)(1−u)v
3 (1− f )
, Φ5( f ) =
12
(2−u)(1−v(1− f ))
2+ 2(N−2)u3 +
(N−2)(2−u)v
3 (1− f )
, Ψ1( f ) =
1−v(1− f )
1+(N−1)v(1− f ) , and Ψ2( f ) =
(1−u)(1−v(1− f ))
1+(N−1)u+(N−1)(1−u)v(1− f ) . The omitted f (x)
describes the migration pattern. The expression of f (x) is f (x) = 1M−1
∑M−1
j=1 cos
2pi jx
M for global
migration and is f (x) = cos 2pixM for local migration.
The definition of the mean offer p is p = limS→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1 × 〈xk〉δ→0. According to Eq. (6), the
mean offer 〈p〉 is
p = limS→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S + ω
1−u
Nu limS→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1 (Γ1(akk − a∗∗) + Γ2(ak∗ − a∗k) + Γ3(ak∗ − a)). (7)
Because
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S =
∫ 1
0
xdx = 12 ,
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S akk =
∫ 1
0
xa(x, x)dx = 1/2,
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S a∗∗ =
1
2
∫ 1
0
a(x, x)dx = 1/2,
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S a∗k =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
y2dxdy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y
y(1 − x)dxdy = 7/24,
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S ak∗ =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
xydxdy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y
x(1 − x)dxdy = 5/24,
lim
S→+∞
∑S
k=1
k−1
S−1
1
S a =
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
y/2dxdy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
y
(1 − x)/2dxdy = 1/4,
we have
p =
1
2
− ω 1 − u
24Nu
(2Γ2 + Γ3) =
1
2
− ω (1 − u)(N − 1)
24Mu
M∑
x=1
(Ψ1( f (x) − Ψ2( f (x)). (8)
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